Selected publications
Unequal and Unstable: Income Inequality and Bank Risk (with Yuliyan Mitkov), forthcoming, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. EEA annual meeting 2020 conference paper, AEA 2021 annual meeting conference paper (poster session), Bonn/ Mannheim CRCTR224 Working paper No. 261, PDF.
Natural disasters and bank stability: Evidence from the U.S. financial system (with Felix Noth), 2023, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 119, 102792, A previous version is available as Research Center SAFE working paper No. 167 (April 2018; revised February 2023), PDF.
How do banks react to catastrophic events? Evidence from Hurricane Katrina (with Claudia Lambert and Felix Noth), 2019, Review of Finance 23, 75-116. AEA 2012, EFA 2012, FIRS 2012 conference paper, A previous version is available as Research Center SAFE working paper No. 94 (September 2017).
Add-On Pricing in Retail Financial Markets and the Fallacies of Consumer Education (with Michael Kosfeld), 2017, Review of Finance 21, 1189-1216. Previous versions are available as AEA 2010 conference paper, Econometric Society World Congress 2010 conference paper, CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8636, IZA Discussion Paper No. 6061, Research Center SAFE working paper No. 47 (September 2016).
How do insured deposits affect bank risk? Evidence from the 2008 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (with Claudia Lambert and Felix Noth), 2017, Journal of Financial Intermediation 29, 81-102. A previous version is available as Research Center SAFE working paper No. 38 (October 2015).
Further publications and policy papers
Structural Reforms in Banking: The Role of Trading (with Jan-Pieter Krahnen and Felix Noth), 2017, Journal of Financial Regulation 3, 66-88. PDF. A previous version is available as SAFE Policy White Paper No. 33. PDF. A summary in German is available as "Ein Verbot wäre wenig zielführend", Bankmagazin (04/2016).
Auswirkung der Einlagensicherung auf das Bankenrisiko (with Claudia Lambert and Felix Noth), 2016, Ökonomenstimme, 17. Feb. 2016.
Funktionen und Einsatz von Finanzderivaten, 2023/2015/2012/2009/2008 (until 2012 with Sascha Steffen), in: Jean-Claude Zerey (Hrsg.), Finanzderivate, Baden-Baden: Nomos, p. 43-67.
Regulatory forbearance and the role of financial reporting transparency during a bank crisis (with Olaf Clemens), 2014, Credit and Capital Markets (previously Kredit und Kapital), volume 47, issue 1, pp. 49-77, PDF.
Germany: The persistence of the three pillar banking system (with Dilek Bülbül and Reinhard H. Schmidt), 2014, in: Butzbach and von Mettenheim (Eds.), Alternative Banking and Financial Crisis, London: Pickering & Chatto Publishers (now Routledge).
Caisses D’Épargne et Banques Coopératives en Europe (with Dilek Bülbül and Reinhard H. Schmidt), 2013, Revue d’Économie Financière, No. 111, pp. 159-187. Also available in English as “Savings Banks and Cooperative Banks in Europe”, Goethe-University SAFE White Paper Series No. 5 (August 2013). Shorter versions are available in German as „Vielfalt im Bankenwesen bewahren“, Bankmagazin (Dezember 2013) and in English as „Savings Banks and Cooperative Banks in European Banking Systems“, SAFE BANK (2013), published by the Polish Bank Guarantee Fund, pp. 38-49. French publication, PDF (english version).
Current working papers (selection)
Borrower Heterogeneity and Bank Risk (with Yuliyan Mitkov).
Current version: March 2025.
We utilize tools from survival analysis to examine the risk of bank failure in a model with imperfect correlation in loan defaults..
Foreclosure Laws and the Pass-Through of Local Disaster Risk to Mortgage Lending.
Current version: January 2026.
Abstract: This paper explores how state foreclosure laws shape the pass-through of local disaster risk -- a specific dimension of credit risk -- into mortgage supply and pricing. Using HMDA data on jumbo mortgage applications (ineligible for GSE purchase) matched to census-tract disaster-risk measures, I find that high disaster risk significantly reduces approval probabilities in borrower-friendly states (nonrecourse or judicial), but not in lender-friendly states (recourse and nonjudicial). The effect is economically large: in borrower-friendly states, approval probabilities are about 5–6 percentage points lower for applications in the top decile of disaster risk. Loan terms of approved loans also adjust with the foreclosure regime: loan-to-value ratios decline and interest rates rise with disaster risk more in nonrecourse than in recourse states, though magnitudes are small. The results highlight how foreclosure laws materially affect the pass-through of location-specific risk to credit allocation and pricing.