Selected publications
Natural disasters and bank stability: Evidence from the U.S. financial system (with Felix Noth), 2023, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 119, 102792, A previous version is available as Research Center SAFE working paper No. 167 (April 2018; revised February 2023), PDF.
How do banks react to catastrophic events? Evidence from Hurricane Katrina (with Claudia Lambert and Felix Noth), 2019, Review of Finance 23, 75-116. AEA 2012, EFA 2012, FIRS 2012 conference paper, A previous version is available as Research Center SAFE working paper No. 94 (September 2017).
Add-On Pricing in Retail Financial Markets and the Fallacies of Consumer Education (with Michael Kosfeld), 2017, Review of Finance 21, 1189-1216. Previous versions are available as AEA 2010 conference paper, Econometric Society World Congress 2010 conference paper, CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8636, IZA Discussion Paper No. 6061, Research Center SAFE working paper No. 47 (September 2016).
How do insured deposits affect bank risk? Evidence from the 2008 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (with Claudia Lambert and Felix Noth), 2017, Journal of Financial Intermediation 29, 81-102. A previous version is available as Research Center SAFE working paper No. 38 (October 2015).
Further publications and policy papers
Structural Reforms in Banking: The Role of Trading (with Jan-Pieter Krahnen and Felix Noth), 2017, Journal of Financial Regulation 3, 66-88. PDF. A previous version is available as SAFE Policy White Paper No. 33. PDF. A summary in German is available as "Ein Verbot wäre wenig zielführend", Bankmagazin (04/2016).
Auswirkung der Einlagensicherung auf das Bankenrisiko (with Claudia Lambert and Felix Noth), 2016, Ökonomenstimme, 17. Feb. 2016.
Funktionen und Einsatz von Finanzderivaten, 2023/2015/2012/2009/2008 (until 2012 with Sascha Steffen), in: Jean-Claude Zerey (Hrsg.), Finanzderivate, Baden-Baden: Nomos, p. 43-67.
Regulatory forbearance and the role of financial reporting transparency during a bank crisis (with Olaf Clemens), 2014, Credit and Capital Markets (previously Kredit und Kapital), volume 47, issue 1, pp. 49-77, PDF.
Germany: The persistence of the three pillar banking system (with Dilek Bülbül and Reinhard H. Schmidt), 2014, in: Butzbach and von Mettenheim (Eds.), Alternative Banking and Financial Crisis, London: Pickering & Chatto Publishers (now Routledge).
Caisses D’Épargne et Banques Coopératives en Europe (with Dilek Bülbül and Reinhard H. Schmidt), 2013, Revue d’Économie Financière, No. 111, pp. 159-187. Also available in English as “Savings Banks and Cooperative Banks in Europe”, Goethe-University SAFE White Paper Series No. 5 (August 2013). Shorter versions are available in German as „Vielfalt im Bankenwesen bewahren“, Bankmagazin (Dezember 2013) and in English as „Savings Banks and Cooperative Banks in European Banking Systems“, SAFE BANK (2013), published by the Polish Bank Guarantee Fund, pp. 38-49. French publication, PDF (english version).
Current working papers (selection)
Unequal and Unstable: Income Inequality and Bank Risk (with Yuliyan Mitkov). EEA annual meeting 2020 conference paper, AEA 2021 annual meeting conference paper (poster session), Bonn/ Mannheim CRCTR224 Working paper No. 261, current version: March 2025, R&R Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.
Abstract: We study a model in which income inequality interacts with banks’ risk‐taking incentives to generate financial instability. In equilibrium, competition and deposit insurance lead some banks to specialize in lending to lower‐income borrowers, offering subsidized rates that do not adequately price in default risk. These “risky” banks fail during economic downturns. Meanwhile, “safe” banks serve higher‐income borrowers, avoiding default even in downturns. The overall impact of rising inequality depends on how it expands the subprime relative to the prime credit segment. Further, the link between borrower risk and bank risk is not automatic: if banks cannot risk shift, bank failure becomes less likely even though the subprime borrower segment becomes riskier. Our analysis highlights the importance of eliminating banks’ risk-shifting opportunities.